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1 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
KING BROS., INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
UTAH DRY KILN COMPANY, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent 
.................................................... ................................................... 
Case No. 10931 
BRIEF Of APPELLANT 
................................................... ................................................... 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff-Appellant 
as a supplier of building material to the Defendant-Re-
spondent for the building of a lumber dry kiln at Pan-
guitch, Utah, and is brought under Sections 14-2-1 and 
14-2-2, Utah Code Ann. 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court found the issues for the Defendant-
Respondent after a trial without a jury and rendered a 
judgment for the defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the Dis-
trict Court Judgment and directing the lower court to 
enter judgment for the appellant as prayed for in its 
complaint. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
. This is the second time the Appellant has appealed 
this same case to this Court, the first case being found 
in 374 Pac.2d 254 and in which this court reversed the 
lower court's order dismissing the action and the case 
was sent back for trial. The question before the Court 
on the first appeal was whether or not the plaintiff was 
entitled to present evidence showing that the material 
supplied had been attached to the realty so as to be an 
improvement to land which fact had been questioned 
by the Defendant-Respondent. 
The amended complaint (R-8-11) is in two causes 
of action and alleges that the plaintiff King Bros., Inc. 
supplied to the building contractor, Oregon Dryer Com-
pany one burner with stack opening and one furnace 
casing of a value of $2,692.00 for installation in the dry 
kiln of the defendant at Panguitch, Utah and also that 
the plaintiff's assignor, Mead and Associates supplied to 
Oregon Dryer Company three aerovent Macheta Semi-
pressure fans and steel panel orifice and three breather 
pipes and hoods of a value of $1,463.19 for installation in 
the defendant's dry kiln. Neither supplier of this equip-
ment was paid by Oregon Dryer Company or the de-
fendant, and the contractor, Oregon Dryer Company has 
gone defunct and so the suppliers now seek a judgment 
against the defendant-Respondent as the owner of the 
dry kiln for the reason that the contract was in excess 
of $500.00 and that the defendant had not required a 
bond of the contractor as required by law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
THE EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY PLAINTIFF-AP-
PELLANT WAS INSTALLED IN THE BUILDING OF 
THE DEFENDANT AND BECAME AN IMPROVE-
MENT TO THE LAND AND THE DEFENDANT IS 
LIABLE UNDER SECTION 14-2-1 AND 2, UTAH 
CODE ANN. 1953. 
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This is an action brought under the following sta-
tutes: 
"14-2-1 Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. 
The owner of any interest in land entering·into a con-
tract, involving $500 or more, for the construction, 
addition to, or alteration or repair of, any building, 
structure or improvement upon land shall, before any 
such work is commenced, obtain from the contractor 
a bond in a sum equal to the contract price, with good 
and sufficient sureties, conditioned· for the faithful 
performance of the contract and prompt payment for 
material furnished and labor performed under the 
contract. Such bond shall run to the owner and to all 
other persons as their interest may appear; and any 
person who has furnished materials or performed la-
bor for or upon any such building, structure or im-
provement, payment for which has not been made, 
shall have a direct right of action against the sureties 
upon such bond for the reasonable value of the ma-
terials. furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, 
however, in any case the price agreed upon, which 
right of action shall accrue forty days after the com-
pletion, or abandonment, or default in the perform-
ance of the work provided for in the contract. 
The bond herein provided for shall be exhibited to 
any person interested, upon request." 
"14-2-2, Failure to require bond - Direct liability. Any 
person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who 
shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or 
to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall be per-
sonally liable to all persons who have furnished ma-
terials or performed labor under the contract for the 
reasonable value of such materials furnished or labor 
performed not exceeding, however, in any case the 
Price agreed upon." 
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In the first appeal of this same case the Respondent 
claimed that the above statutes were not applicable be-
cause the dry kilning equipment sued for still retained 
its identity as machinery or equipment and was in the 
nature of personal property, not affixed to the realty so 
as to become an improvement to land. The lower court 
so ruled and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
This Court on appeal reversed the lower court and ruled 
that as to whether the equipment sued for was affixed 
to the realty so as to become an improvement was a 
question upon which testimony must be taken and the 
plaintiff was entitled to its "day in court." 
At the trial of the case below, the evidence amply 
substantiated the claim of the plaintiff-appellant that 
the equipment sued for actually became affixed to the 
land so as to be an improvement under the above sta· 
tutes. From the language of the opinion in the first case, 
King Bros., Inc., vs. Utah Dry Kiln Company, Inc. 374 
Pac.2d 254 and the evidence submitted (R-21) and the 
pictures of the installation (R-33-34) it is clear that the 
equipment was affixed to and became an integral part 
of the dry kiln and in fact the building would not be a 
dry kiln without the equipment. In fact the defendant 
has practically conceded that such was the case (R-45· 
45) . This is so by reason of the holding and language in 
the opinion in the first case and particularly by reason 
of the case of Metals Manufacturing Co. vs. Bank of 
Commerce, 395 Pac.2d 914 (Utah) decided after the 
first King Bros. case was decided. It should be noted 
that in this Bank of Commerce case there was only a 
ten year lease on the building in question and the equip· 
ment sued for had not been installed with as much per· 
manency as the equipment in this case and there was 
even an agreement between the lessee and the lessor 
that the very equipment sued for would remain personal 
property. 
I 
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Therefore, this appellant contends that under the 
facts shown and the opinion in the first King Bros. case 
and the Bank of Commerce case, the issue of whether 
the equipment sued for was so affixed to the realty as 
to become an improvement has been resolved in favor 
of the appellant. 
POINT NO. 2 
THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT WAS THE OWN-
ER OF AN INTEREST IN THE LAND UPON WHICH 
THE KILN WAS BUILT AND THE STATUTES RE-
LIED UPON ARE APPLICABLE. 
At the trial of the case and the defendant-respond-
ent's Memorandum of Authorities submitted below, the 
claim is made that the defendant was not an owner of 
an interest in the land upon which the dry kiln was built 
and therefore, the statutes under which this action is 
brought are not applicable. In fact this was the basis 
for the lower court's decision. It is admitted by the plain-
tiff-appellant that the defendant does not hold a deed 
for the land and does not hold legal title thereto. In 
fact the record shows, (Transc.-112) that the land upon 
which the kiln is built is actually owned by J. E. Croft 
and Sons, a partnership and by Croft-Pearson Indus-
tries, now a corporation but also a partnership at the 
time the building was built. However, this Court has 
ruled a number of times that the person building the 
improvements does not have to be the legal owner of 
the land as such and that a leasehold is sufficient. In 
the last pronouncement from this Court in interpret-
ing the statutes relied upon, the Bank of Commerce 
case, supra, the "owner" held only a lease. 
As pointed out in the first case on appeal, the laws 
pertaining to Mechanics' liens are practically the same 
as the statutes under which this action is brought and 
are very helpful in determining the application of the 
statutes sued upon here. 36 Am. Jur. page 36 provides 
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that a leasehold is sufficient ownership of land for the 
filing of a mechanics' lien and likewise the old Utah 
case of Ellis vs. Porter, 29 Pac. 879 and also the more 
recent case of Buehner Block Co. vs. Glezos, 310 Pac.2d 
517, (Utah) held that a leasehold was sufficient for a 
mechanic's lien. 
There are also other cases where a person who does 
not hold legal title to land is nevertheless an owner of 
an interest in land sufficient for mechanics' liens. One 
such case is Garland vs. Bear Lake & River Waterworks 
& Irrigation Co. 34 Pac. 368 (Utah) where the "owner" 
at the time the contractor did the work in making a 
canal actually did not own the land where the canal was 
being constructed but instead it was government land 
and never would go into private ownership until the im-
provement was constructed. Also the case of Cary-
Lombard Lumber Co. vs. Sheets, 37 Pac. 572 (Utah) 
held that possession under a contract of purchase made 
one an "owner" under the mechanics' lien laws. Also 
36 Am. Jur., page 34, in speaking of mechanics' liens 
provides as follows: 
"Thus it may attach not only to an estate in fee sim-
ple, but also to an estate less than a fee such as a life 
estate, an estate for years, an estate in remainder, 
and the interest of a person in possession". 
The footnote to the above 36 Am. Jur. citation pro-
vides as follows: 
"A person in possession is presumed to have an in-
terest chargeable with a lien until the contrary is 
made to appear by pleading or proof". 
It is admitted that the defendant did not even hold 
a formal lease on the land upon which the dry kiln was 
built. However, under the facts of this case, the defend-
ant had something better than a formal lease - a per· 
7 
m1ss10n to use the land indefinitely, at no rent or pay-
ment of any taxes and with the owners of the land being 
the officers and directors of the defendant corporation. 
In rural areas of Utah amongst farmers, livestock-
men and businessmen such as those involved here the 
' corporate fiction or entity is neither appreciated or un-
derstood as it is amongst lawyers. Very often the same 
men are officers of several corporations, connected to-
gether in property holdings and operation and also some 
of the officers might own personally property used by 
the corporation. The business of each is not kept sep-
arate and it is often difficult to determine where pri-
vate business and property ownership begins and ends 
with reference to corporation business. 
It is clear from the facts that the land in question 
was actually owned by J. E. Croft and Sons, a partner-
ship and Croft-Pearson Industries, another partnership. 
J. E. Croft and Sons, a partnership, consisted of Leo 
Croft, John Croft, Cy Croft, Alfred Croft and Edward 
Croft. Croft-Pearson Industries, a partnership, consist-
ed of Marden Pearson, Dwain Pearson, Cy Croft, Leo 
Croft, John Croft and Edward Croft. The directors and 
officers of Utah Dry Kiln Co., Inc., the defendant com-
any were Marden Pearson, Dwain Pearson, Cy Croft, 
Leo Croft, John Croft and Edward Croft, (Transc. 115, 
117, 137). Therefore four of the five partners in J. E. 
Croft and Sons were also four of the six partners in 
Croft-Pearson Industries. These same four partners in 
J. E. Croft and Sons were four of the six directors of 
the defendant corporation. Five of the six partners 
of Croft-Pearson Industries were five of the six di-
rectors of the defendant corporation. All of the officers 
and directors of the defendant corporation were part-
ners in the two partnerships. Likewise these directors 
own most if not all of the corporate stock in the defend-
ant corporation. Under these circumstances the Re-
spondent still claims that all it had was a mere license 
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which often is not an interest in land but the relation-
ship between the directors and the legal owners made 
this much more that a mere license - it made it the 
owner of an interest in land. In fact the corporation is 
the alter ego of the owners of the land. 
The testimony shows that the defendant corpora-
tion and Croft-Pearson Industries, then a partnership 
but now a corporation, operate together a considerable 
lumber business. They operate together on the same 
yards and use the same office building at Panguitch, 
Utah. The testimony further shows that the officers 
and directors of the defendant corporation and also the 
partners in the two partnerships never considered it 
necessary to execute a deed or a formal lease, (Transc. 
116, 117). All parties concerned, whether they be officers 
of the defendant corporation or partners in one of 
the partnerships, were generally one and the same 
and it never occurred to the officers in the de-
fendant corporation to go to the trouble or for-
mality of a lease or deed from the owners, who were 
actually themselves, yet they built a dry kiln costing 
approximately $34,000.00. There has been no thought 
of cancellation or termination of the arrangements be· 
cause the ones who would have to cancel are the officers 
and directors of the defendant corporation. Under the tes· 
timony this arrangement appears to be mutually satisf ac-
tory-the Croft-Pearson Industries, as a lumber company 
had an outlet for its finish lumber right on the prem· 
ises and the defendant corporation's dry kiln is located 
right next to the sawmills where it has a ready supply 
of lumber and even saw-dust for fuel. By permitting 
the corpora ti on to remain in possession of the proper· 
ty, the owners are only permitting themselves to use 
their own property. In fact the owners of the land rec· 
ognize the defendant corporation as the owner of the 
building, although it may have no legal title in the 
strict sense of the work. It is submitted that the d~­
fendant corporation, by reason of the permissive use is 
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an owner of an interest in land within the meaning of 
the statute, particularly so when the directors of the 
defendant corporation own personally the land. It would 
appear that this is a much better arrangement than a 
mere lease. 
Furthermore, should the defendant corporation be 
able to profit by this loose arrangement by being im-
mune from many types of legal liability? Obviously no 
person supplying labor or materials to the building, or 
for repairs or improvements to it could ever file a me-
chanics' lien as the corporation could hide behind the 
fact that it had no legal title to land or any interest 
which a lien could reach. No judgment would ever be a 
lien. It would seem that this could very well be a situa-
tion where the corporate veil or entity could be pierced 
and ignored. In this connection, the language of an Ore-
gon case is very pertinent. In the case of Mciver vs. 
Norman, 213 Pac.2d. 144, the court uses the following 
language: 
"Mclver was the corporation and the corporation 
was Mciver. Not only does Norman claim this by 
laying the corporation's alleged derelictions at the 
door of Mclver, Mclver does likewise by taking to 
himself credit for the corporation's good deeds." 
"While for all ordinary purposes, a corporation is 
regarded as a legal entity, separate and distinct from 
its stockholders, yet, as Judge Sanborn said in United 
States vs. Milwaukee Refrigeration Co. 142 Fed. 247, 
'When the notion of legal entity is used to defeat pub-
lic convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or de-
fend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an 
association of persons'." 
Also in the case of Abbott vs. Bob's U-Drive, 352 Pac.2d. 
598 (Ore.) the Court said: 
"It is well established that where corporate affairs are 
confused with those of stockholders, a subsidiary or 
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an affiliate corporation, the corporate veil may be lift. 
e? to protect persons whose rights have been jeopar· 
d1zed by the corporate device." 
Can the defendant corporation, by a loose arrange. 
ment between its directors and officers and the own. 
ers of the property, who are for all practical purposes 
the same, known only to themselves, deprive a material· 
man from enforcing his rights? Can they insulate them-
selves from liability imposed by the statutes in ques-
tion? The Bank of Commerce case, supra, goes into this 
very point and held that an owner of property and its 
tenant cannot by arrangement between them and known 
only to themselves, deprive a materialman from enforc-
ing his rights. 
This case should not be confused with a lien fore· 
closure action or any other like action against real 
property. This is an action personally against Utah Dry 
Kiln Company. The plaintiff is not proceeding against 
land as it would in a mortgage foreclosure, mechanics' 
lien foreclosure or in an attachment suit against land. 
In these actions the plaintiff actually proceeds against 
the land itself and if the defendant does not own the 
land, then the plaintiff often has no remedy. But this 
is only a personal action against the defendant com· 
pany and is seeking only a general judgment, not a lien 
judgment and any judgment obtained would not have 
to describe real property or specifically provide for the 
sale of specific real property to satisfy any judgment. 
This would be a general judgment the same as any 
other general judgment True it would become a lien 
on all real property but if the defendant owned no real 
property, there would be nothing for the judgment lien 
to attach to. But that should not stop the court from 
rendering a general judgment against the defendant. 
Any judgment rendered would only be a judgment 
against the defendant and it would not affect the land 
of J. E. Crofts and Sons or Croft-Pearson Industries and 
J 
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no one but the defendant would be obligated to pay the 
judgment. 
We should not lose sight of the reason for the sta-
tutes herein relied upon which is as pointed out in the 
opinion in the first appeal - it would be wrong to per-
mit an owner of property to have the benefits of an im-
provement without paying for it. Certainly no one 
could claim that the defendant here is not benefitting 
from the materials supplied by the plaintiff if the mater-
ials do not have to be paid for. Under the arrangement 
for the use of the property it will benefit from the ma-
terial supplied just as much as if it owned the land. The 
corporation's only concern would be that possibly at 
some remote time, the owners of the land would "kick" 
the defendant company off the premises but as herein 
shown, it would be a situation of the owners kicking 
themselves off the land. 
Since the evil these statutes are intended to pre-
vent is having your property benefitted by the labors 
or materials of some one else without paying for it, that 
should be the main concern of the Court; not a techni-
cal or strict application of the statutes which would de-
feat justice and equity and do violence to common sense. 
It would also appear that this arrangement be-
tween the legal owners of the land and the defendant 
corporation could well be determined to be a joint ven-
ture between a corporation and a partnership, consist-
ing of the same individuals, in the operation of a saw-
mill and finished lumber business, with the assets of 
one, committed to the joint venture, being the assets 
of the other. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it appears that without question the 
equipment supplied by the plaintiff was used in and in· 
corporated into the dry kiln of the defendant and most 
certainly was an improvement to land. That by the meth· 
od of operation between the defendant and the legal 
holders of legal title to the land, the defendant corpora-
tion has a sufficient interest in land to come within the 
meaning of the statute and sufficient to prevent the 
wrong which the statute was intended to prevent. That 
if there is any question about whether the defendant 
has a sufficient interest in land, the closeness between 
the corporate officers and the legal owners, who are for 
all practical purposes the same, make the arrangement, 
whatever it may be called, an interest in land sufficient 
that the defendant corporation should not be allowed to 
dodge its financial responsibilities by its own "sloppy" 
business arrangements. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ORVILLE ISOM 
Attorney for Appellant 
